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Corporate Triplespeak
RESPONSES BY INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES TO
THE EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN
Alan R. Palmiter†
INTRODUCTION
It is August 2, 2015. Tomorrow the Obama administration
will unveil its finalized Clean Power Plan (CPP), the centerpiece of
the administration’s environmental agenda.1 The plan proposed by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in June 2014 had
called for a 32 percent reduction of CO2 emissions in the U.S.
electric power sector by 2030.2 Reductions would be carried out
† William T. Wilson, III, Presidential Chair for Business Law, School of Law,
Wake Forest University. I thank Brooklyn Law School—and especially Professors
Roberta Karmel and Jim Fanto—for the invitation to present this paper at Brooklyn’s
fabled Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture on September 28, 2017. I thank the Brooklyn Law
Review for publishing this essay, which is a disconcerting mix of political science, social
psychology, and legal textual analysis—concluding with a flurry of biology-based
evolutionary theory applied to behavioral economics. In other words, I am certainly wrong
about many of my descriptions, assumptions, and conclusions. But I was not wrong in
relying on the excellent research of three Wake Forest students: Khalif Timberlake
(JD/MBA ‘18) researched the political economy of the CPP; Cara Van Dorn (JD ‘17)
summarized disclosures by the largest IOUs; and Austin Thompson (JD ‘17) commented
on the social psychology premises of the essay and provided additional research on the
CPP’s background and industry responses. Finally, I thank Professors Tamara Belinfanti
and Daniel Greenwood for their excellent comments on my lecture and on this paper. Many
oversights, misimpressions, and failings remain—they are all mine.
1 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN 1 (2015), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-
cpp-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DEF-47N3]. In this, now archived fact sheet, the
EPA described the CPP as:
a historic and important step in reducing carbon pollution from power plants
that takes real action on climate change. Shaped by years of unprecedented
outreach and public engagement, the final Clean Power Plan is fair, flexible
and designed to strengthen the fast-growing trend toward cleaner and lower-
polluting American energy. With strong but achievable standards for power
plants, and customized goals for states to cut the carbon pollution that is
driving climate change, the Clean Power Plan provides national consistency,
accountability and a level playing field while reflecting each state’s energy mix.
It also shows the world that the United States is committed to leading global
efforts to address climate change.
Id. at 1.
2 See id. at 2.
984 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
through state-by-state goals set by the EPA on the basis of
projections of how each state could modify its fuel mix for
producing electric power and reduce its power consumption’s
carbon footprint.3 Over the past year the proposal has met with
unprecedented waves of support and opposition.
This essay considers how, during the year following the
EPA proposal, the largest investor-owned electric utilities
engaged in a curious “triplespeak.” Employing the moral
language of political conservatives, many of the utilities focused
on whether and how the EPA had transgressed its “traditional”
regulatory role, thus altering the “structure” of energy
federalism (the relationship between federal and state law in
regulating the nation’s sourcing and use of energy) and
potentially “degrading” orderly power supplies. In their filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), most of
the utilities used the moral language of political libertarians,
focusing on the “financial risks” that federal government
“intervention” poses to efficient power “markets” and to the
“freedom” of utilities to match energy supplies and customer
demand. Meanwhile, in their Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) reports, most of the utilities used the moral language of
political progressives, highlighting their concern for the “well-
being” of their customers and other stakeholders, their desire to
“protect” the environment from the “threat” of climate change,
and their “voluntary efforts” to shift away from fossil fuels
toward non-carbon sources, especially renewables. In many
instances, the same utility company took all of these seemingly
inconsistent moral stances at about the same time.
This essay begins by looking at the political economy of
the proposed Clean Power Plan, describing the various positions
that the interested parties staked out for and against the plan
during the year it was under consideration by the EPA. The
arguments that swirled during the year largely reflected the
broader political maelstrom between conservatives,
progressives, and libertarians. Each side adopted predictable
stances based on stated concerns about energy federalism,
response to climate change, electric consumer well-being,
environmental protection, state prerogatives in setting the fuel
mix for utilities, electric grid reliability, and the authority of
Congress over national energy policy. Somewhat absent from
this debate, though, were the large investor-owned utilities
(IOUs)—the companies that supply about two-thirds of all U.S.
homes and businesses with electricity.
3 See id. at 3.
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The peculiar absence of the IOUs led me to ponder the
nature of the arguments in the debate over the proposed Clean
Power Plan, arguments that were largely political. The recent
area of moral psychology has sought to explain the ways in which
individuals come tomoral (and political) views. Contrary to the long-
standing assumption thatwearrive at ourmoral/political judgments
based on rational processes in which information and arguments
lead towell-reasoned conclusions, recent studiesmake clear that our
moral judgments arise intuitively, emotionally, nearly instantly
from deeply-held moral values—and then we engage in motivated
reasoning to explain to ourselves and others the coherence of these
views. In the United States, people who identify themselves as
liberal/progressives have come to adhere to the values of
compassion and fairness/equality, while conservatives find
meaning in the additional values of loyalty, authority, and
sacredness, while libertarians are moved primarily by the moral
values of liberty and market freedom, as well as
fairness/proportionality.
So what moral/political stance, I then wondered, were the
IOUs taking with respect to the proposed Clean Power Plan? The
answer was surprising. Looking at a sample of the largest ten
IOUs, these companies’ stated positions on the EPA’s proposal
varied significantly depending on whether they were speaking in
their SEC-filed annual reports on Form 10-K, whether they were
addressing the proposal in their formal comments to the EPA, or
whether they were describing the EPA proposal in their CSR
reports. The IOUs, I discovered, were mostly “libertarian” in their
SEC disclosures, generally “conservative” in their EPA comments,
and almost uniformly “progressive” in their CSR reports. I describe
this as “triplespeak”—a manifestation of a political, multiple
personality. Not only did the collective response to the EPA
proposal by these industry leaders exhibit this triplespeak, but it
was often the case that the same company was at once libertarian,
conservative and progressive in its expressed views on the EPA’s
proposed restructuring of the industry.
This led me to consider what might explain this
triplespeak, a phenomenon that might well arise in many other
corporate disclosures. At one level, the explanation might be
somewhat unremarkable: large corporations speak politically in
different ways according to their audience. Thus, one would
expect a more conservative stance from IOUs in politically
conservative parts of the country and a more progressive
positioning from IOUs in politically liberal regions. And, in fact,
there seemed to be a correlation. Further, one might expect
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different functional units of a large corporation to cater to their
particular audiences, each audience with its own political/moral
matrix. Thus, the finance unit that prepares SEC disclosures is
likely to mirror the pro-market/libertarian leanings of investors;
the government affairs unit that prepares regulatory
comments is likely to echo the traditional/conservative views of
its political cohort; and the sustainability unit that prepares
CSR reports is likely to exude the platitudes of its green/liberal
community.
But something more seemed afoot. The electric utility
industry, beginning a few years ago, has found itself in the midst
of a “slow-motion train wreck,” its traditional business model of
centralized generation, proprietary transmission, and captive
distribution is undergoing wrenching change. Not only has the
recent emergence of interstate generation and transmission
markets altered the industry, but the cost and ownership
structure for renewables (both utility-scale and consumer-
sourced) and the technological transformation of the grid
promise to destabilize and remake the century-old electric utility
business model. The EPA’s proposal that the industry change its
fuel mix to be less carbon-intensive represents a part of this
fundamental remaking.
Perhaps, I then speculated, the triplespeak by the IOUs
represents an adaptation—a set of mutant positions each laying
out a different perspective on where the companies, and their
industry, are headed—to prepare each company with a revised
mindset (and vocabulary) for what is coming next. Just as we
individuals will often “try out” different explanations of our
responses to novelty, the largest electric utilities are in the throes
of figuring outwhether their futurewill bemarket-based (the trend
over the past couple decades), regulation-dependent (the historical
business model), ecology-driven (the path envisioned by many,
including the EPA) or most likely, a combination of the three.
Interestingly, as you read this, your views on this question reflect
your own value-driven moral matrix—and your views arose
intuitively, emotionally, instantly.
I. RESPONSES TO THE EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER
PLAN
All told, more than 4.3 million comments were submitted
to the EPA from nearly every conceivable political constituency
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and interest group in the country.4 As the comments made clear,
the EPA’s proposal was “one of the more singularly controversial
regulations ever promulgated” and presented a host of
constitutional, statutory, policy and technical issues.5 The
proposal’s state-by-state emissions goals constituted a dramatic
intrusion into the traditional regulation of the power industry by
state public utility commissions (local generation and distribution)
and by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (interstate
generation and transmission). The plan’s goals would force states
to adopt a revamped “fuel mix” for generating each state’s power
needs, to add new grid capabilities, and to reshape power-
consumption habits.6 Its tight schedule would compel states to
come up with a package of laws within a year of the plan’s
finalization tomeet the timeline for theEPA’s CO2 reduction goals.7
As the proposal’s critics pointed out, the EPA was not only
remaking U.S. energy federalism, but doing so without political
accountability.8 Early during the Obama Administration, climate
change legislation had failed in Congress, but the EPA was acting
as though it had legislative authority.9
Moreover, as critics pointed out, the provision of the
Clean Air Act (CAA) on which the EPA based its authority—
CAA Section 111(d)10—hardly created a clear basis for the
agency’s regulatory grab over “existing sources” of CO2
emissions, particularly coal-fired power plants.11 According to
4 Final Rule, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/
2015-22842.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTU7-AUK6]. In addition, lobbying on the Clean
Power Plan was extensive, with 130 entities registered as lobbyists on the plan. Anthony
Adragna, Lobbying Continues Unabated on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, BNA (May 4, 2016),
https://www.bna.com/lobbying-continues-unabated-n57982070620/ [https://perma.cc/
96AT-RFG8].
5 LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480,
CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA
V. EPA 1 (2017).
6 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 1.
7 See id. at 8.
8 See Who’s Fighting the Clean Power Plan and EPA Action on Climate
Change?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2016), http://www.ucsusa.org/global-
warming/fight-misinformation/whos-fighting-clean-power-plan-and-epa-action-climate
#.WZrsZa2ZOYU [https://perma.cc/P5JY-5VY2] (identifying ExxonMobil, Peabody Energy,
Southern Company, American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC), and U.S. Chamber of Commerce as leading the campaign
against the EPA’s efforts on climate, including the Clean Power Plan).
9 BryanWalsh,Why the Climate Bill Died, TIME: ECOCENTRIC (July 26, 2010),
http://science.time.com/2010/07/26/why-the-climate-bill-died/ [https://perma.cc/J4WA-
7GB5] (concluding that House-passed cap-and-trade bill was allowed to die in Senate
because public interest in topic had not galvanized).
10 Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
11 See Recent Regulation, Environmental Law—Clean Air Act—EPA Interprets
the Clean Air Act to Allow Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Existing Power
988 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
these critics, the little-used section had been meant only to
create EPA authority when pollution sources were not being
regulated under another provision of the CAA—namely, CAA
§ 112, which requires states to implement plans to regulate
emissions from existing sources based on a cost-benefit
analysis.12 Compounding these questions of proper delegation
was amyriad of policy and technical questions: Was the schedule
for state implementation of the goals feasible? Was the
treatment of under-construction nuclear plants appropriate?
Could the nation’s electric grid handle a switch toward sporadic
solar and wind power generation? Where did the EPA get
authority to compel states to adopt energy efficiency standards
for consumers?
As might be expected, the EPA proposal sparked an
immediate firestorm of political rhetoric—the battle lines mostly
drawn along typical political lines. Environmental groups and
some regional utility consortia embraced the plan as a flexible
and affordable blueprint for moving the electric power sector
away from fossil fuels.13 Meanwhile, many in Congress,14
Plants—The Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60), 129 HARV. L. REV. 1152, 1152, 1153 n.8 (2016). The EPA took the position
in its proposed rulemaking that § 111(d), which permits the EPA to require states to
submit plans for “existing sources” of air pollution not covered by § 112, was ambiguous
and permitted the agency to resolve the ambiguity by compelling states to come up with
state-wide plans to reduce CO2 emissions because these emissions were not otherwise
regulated. Id. at 1153–55. See Clean Power Plan Case Resources, ENVTL. DEF. FOUND. (last
updated 2018), https://www.edf.org/climate/clean-power-plan-case-resources [https://
perma.cc/48QR-E89P] (site compiling filings in lawsuits challenging EPA’s Clean Power
Plan). Congressional Republicans (and some Blue-dog Democrats) attacked the EPA
proposal primarily on two grounds: as part of an Obama Administration “war on coal”
and as an over-extension of federal authority through mandates on state energy
portfolios. See Katherine Ling, House Panel to Grill FERC on Grid Reliability Under
EPA Carbon Rule, E&E DAILY (July 23, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/
1060003321 [https://perma.cc/LUD4-NG4M].
12 Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412; see TSANG & WYATT, supra note 5, at
6–10 (describing legal background of Clean Power Plan and prior litigation challenging
EPA’s proposal).
13 See, e.g., David Doniger,NDRC’s Public Comments on the Clean Power Plan:
How EPA can Make It’s Good Plan Even Better, NDRC (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david-doniger/nrdcs-public-comments-clean-power-plan-
how-epa-can-make-its-good-plan-even [https://perma.cc/9VHS-3F89]. For example, state
governments in the Northeast—members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
which had served as model for the EPA’s proposed state-by-state emission reduction
targets—lauded the EPA plan as “achievable.” See Andrew Childers, States Say Clean
Power Plan Targets Achievable Despite Critiques of Proposal, BNA (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.bna.com/states-say-clean-n17179923810/ [https://perma.cc/RAK6-5SC4];
Colin Sullivan, Northeast ‘Off to a Running Start’ in Advance of Obama Emissions Plan,
ENERGYWIRE (June 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060000600 [https://
perma.cc/6HLP-M2QJ].
14 For example, in an open letter, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) urged state
governors to ignore the Clean Power Plan. See Joel Kirkland, One Senator’s Crusade to
Combat a McConnell Anti-EPA Onslaught, E&E NEWS (June 3, 2015), https://
www.eenews.net/stories/1060019526 [https://perma.cc/FT6T-NKP7]; see also Jean
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members of the business community, a number of state
governors and attorneys general,15 municipal utilities,16 rural co-
ops,17 and conservative think tanks attacked the plan as a heavy-
handed federal usurpation of traditional state utility regulation
and a misguided distortion of the market forces that set the fuel
mix for the power sector.18 A lawsuit by a group of states and a
coal company (Murray Energy)19 even asserted that the proposal
itself was illegal and should be enjoined, an unheard-of
extension of the Administrative Procedure Act.20
Chemnick,W.Va. House Members Urge Gov. Tomblin to ‘Just Say No’, E&EDAILY (June
4, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2015/06/04/stories/1060019641 [https://perma.cc/
4KA8-BW2L]. Republican representatives, led by Rep. Ed Whitfield (Kentucky), proposed
legislation that would allow states to opt out of CPP compliance if a state determined
compliance would increase electricity rates or threaten reliability. See Ari Natter, House
Plans June Votes on Bills Targeting Clean Power Plan, Chemicals Law, Coal Ash,
BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (May 29, 2015), http://dailyreport.bna.com/
drpt/7010/split_display.adp?fedfid=69631683&vname=dernotallissues&fcn=44&wsn=6
81978000&fn=69631683&split=0 [https://perma.cc/7HEH-XWW7] (describing proposed
“Ratepayer Protection Act”). Other bills would block implementation of the EPA’s
proposal and set strict requirements for any further carbon emission regulations. See
Anthony Adragna, Senators Hope to Consider Bill to Block Clean Power Plan Ahead of
Final Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (June 15, 2015), http://dailyre
port.bna.com/drpt/7010/split_display.adp?fedfid=70416498&vname=dernotallissues&
wsn=678570000&fn=70416498&split=0 [https://perma.cc/8TS7-ZVUA].
15 See Nathanael Massey, Some State Agencies Prepare to Challenge New EPA
Carbon Rule, CLIMATEWIRE (June 27, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/
stories/1060002062 [https://perma.cc/94QT-BP4L] (Attorneys general and governors in
several conservative and energy-focused states attacked the legal validity of the EPA’s
proposal, arguing the plan infringed on state sovereignty.).
16 See Florida Utility Slams EPA Power Plant Rule in Draft Comments,
ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060005936
[https://perma.cc/V3KT-H8H8] (describing concern of municipal utilities that CPP would
make them less competitive, given that investor-owned utilities had made recent
investments in green technologies). Municipal utilities also argued that the CPPwould create
an unhealthy dependency on natural gas, leaving the reliability and cost of power generation
subject to natural gas supplies and pricing. EdwardKlump,Texas Committee Hears of ‘Severe
Threat’ from EPA Carbon Plan, ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
energywire/stories/1060006609 [https://perma.cc/XM5K-T88E].
17 See Rod Kuckro, Coal-heavy Electric Cooperatives Take Hard Line on EPA
Clean Power Plan, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/
stories/1060010539 [https://perma.cc/66WT-C6WT].
18 See Kirkland, supra note 14; see also Chemnick, supra note 14.
19 In reMurray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
20 Id. at 333–36. The lawsuit was dismissed as premature. Id.
(“Petitioners . . . want us to do something that they candidly acknowledge we have never
done before: review the legality of a proposed rule. . . . We do not have authority to review
proposed agency rules.” (emphasis in original)). The lawsuit, originally brought by twelve
coal-reliant states, challenged the EPA’s legal authority under § 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act to promulgate the CPP. See id; Neela Banerjee, 12 States Sue EPA Over Proposed
Power Plant Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-epa-lawsuit-20140805-story.html [https://perma.cc/2HFV-HWZP]; see also Andrew
Childers, Judges Skeptical of Clean Power Plan Authority But Wary of Setting Precedent,
BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://dailyreport.bna.com/
drpt/7010/split_display.adp?fedfid=67116496&vname=dernotallissues&fcn=44&wsn=
692228000&fn=67116496&split=0 [https://perma.cc/9XGS-QE7U] (describing court’s
990 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
In some instances, the arguments against the proposed
CPP were framed in economic terms,21 but more often they
seemed to be driven by politics.22 For example, state
environmental agencies, which the EPA proposal charged with
implementing the plan, represented a microcosm of the political
schism that the EPA’s proposal opened. A Brookings Institution
study, which looked at comments by state environmental
agencies on the proposed EPA plan, found a strong correlation
between opposition to the plan and the political party of the
state’s governor.23 Of the twenty-three state agencies that
argued the CPP was illegal and the twenty-one agencies that
urged the plan be abandoned, all were from states with
Republican governors or from “coal-dependent” Democratic
states (West Virginia and Kentucky).24
Criticism by state environmental agencies of specific
aspects of the proposed CPP sometimes transcended political
lines—but only to some extent. On the question of the plan’s
“fairness” to early-acting states that had already taken
measures to reduce CO2 emissions, the study found that
agencies from Republican states mostly cited this concern in
their comments.25 Similarly, on the question of whether the
reticence about “setting a precedent that could open all federal regulations to legal
challenges at the proposed rule stage”).
21 Electric co-ops (mostly rural) argued that the CPP would force them to
terminate their long-term power purchase agreements with coal-fired power plants,
leading to higher owner-customer rates as the co-ops switched to higher-priced natural
gas-generated electricity. The co-ops claimed that, unlike investor-owned utilities with
access to capital markets, they would face great difficulties in making the changes
needed to comply with the EPA’s plan. See Press Release, America’s Elec. Coops., Clean
Power Plan’s ‘Federal Plan’ and Model Trading Rules Fail to Address Electric Co-ops’
Concerns (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.electric.coop/clean-power-plans-federal-plan-model-
trading-rules-fail-address-electric-co-ops-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/L3KR-989L].
22 As an EPA spokesperson pointed out, “a handful of special-interest critics
are automatically opposed,” and those claiming the CPP would threaten grid reliability
“benefit from maintaining the status quo . . . [when] failing to . . . modernize our electric
grid is the costliest thing we could do.” Hannah Northey, EPA Blog Slams Clean Power
Plan’s ‘Special-Interest Critics’, E&E NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/stories/1060014041 [https://perma.cc/6CYX-SCJR].
23 PHILIP WALLACH & CURTLYN KRAMER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES’
COMMENTS ON THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 2–7 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/cpp.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLU7-DXWC].
24 Id. at 7. These agencies’ arguments tracked those by others opposed to the
CPP: the EPA lacked authority to regulate power plants under § 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act; the EPA’s rulemaking was “procedurally unsound;” and the EPA lacked authority
to regulate “beyond the fence” (state targets that go beyond power plant emission
controls). Id. The Kentucky and West Virginia agencies, both from states with
Democratic governors at the time, argued that the CPP should be abandoned because of
the rule’s “potentially devastating impact on their local economies.” Id. at 9.
25 Id. at 3–4 (finding that fourteen agencies from Republican states and nine
agencies from Democratic states cited this concern). See, e.g., Comments by the Tex.
Comm. on Environ. Quality Regarding the Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating United; Proposed Rule; EPA
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CPP’s carbon intensity reduction goals were feasible and the
proposed implementation timeline attainable, twice as many
agencies from Republican states voiced this concern.26 On
whether moving toward more renewables would affect grid
reliability and risk blackouts, three times as many agencies from
Republican states identified this as a concern.27 In short, politics
at the state level seemed paramount—with the fairness,
feasibility, and risks of the plan of some (but lesser) importance.
In another interesting study on how states lined up on
the EPA’s proposal, Maia Draper of the University of Texas at
Austin found that state support or opposition to the CPP was
more driven by political, ideological factors than by economic
ones.28 The study found that the voting records on environmental
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 at 1 (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-23305&attachmentNumber=3&
contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/L2WY-9FWR]; see also New York State Comments on
Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
UtilityGeneratingUnits, 79 FR34830 at 4 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafterN.Y. State Comments],
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-
23627&attachmentNumber=2&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/6GVT-GX84].
26 WALLACH&KRAMER, supra note 23, at 5–6 (finding twenty-four states with
Republican governors and twelve states with Democratic governors argue that the
reduction goals are unattainable).
27 Id. at 4–6 (finding that this concern was raised by eighteen Republican
states, 64 percent of the states with Republican governors, but only by six Democratic
states, 30 percent of the states with Democratic governors). See, e.g., N.Y. State
Comments, supra note 25, at 8–13. Interestingly, while many state environmental
agencies (mostly in Democratic states) did not address the question of grid reliability,
the topic was on the mind of grid operators. These operators, which administer the
transmission grid across state lines, expressed trepidations about the CPP’s possible
effects on reliability, infrastructure, and cost—whether in Republican or Democratic
regions of the country. Jeffrey Tomich, Grid Operator Says EPA Rule Poses Reliability
Concerns, ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/
1060006205 [https://perma.cc/SF8K-R6KL]; Colin Sullivan, N.Y. Grid Operator Rips
EPA’s Approach to Dual-fuel Plants, Warns of Strained Reliability, ENERGYWIRE (Dec.
3, 2014), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060009832 [https://perma.cc/9JFQ-
K2SE] (describing operators’ concerns that the CPP timetable would not permit
operators to find alternate, reliable sources of power and the CPP failed to address the
need to improve the national grid infrastructure). Some operators, as well as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, urged that the EPA adopt a “safety-valve,” allowing
deviance from the plan’s timetable where grid reliability might be at risk. See Andrew
Childers, EPA, FERC Need Reliability Valve Agreement On Clean Power Plan, Utilities,
Grids Say, BLOOMBERG ENVIRON. (May 11, 2015), https://bnanews.bna.com/environme
nt-and-energy/epa-ferc-need-reliability-valve-agreement-on-clean-power-plan-
utilities-grids-say [https://perma.cc/GL5M-U85K]; see also Andrew Childers, ‘Safety
Valve,’ Realistic Targets Vital to EPA Clean Power Plan, States, Utilities Say,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.bna.com/safety-valve-realistic-n1717992
3220/ [https://perma.cc/3WAF-E88A].
28 Maia Draper, Carbon Pricing, Politics and the Clean Power Plan, 20–22
(2016) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, Univ. of Tex. at Austin), https://repositories.lib.
utexas.edu/handle/2152/38196 [https://perma.cc/FSS6-T8JP] (testing independent
variables of the percentage of votes cast for President Obama in the 2012 presidential
election, the average environmental score of a state’s Congressional delegation from
2011–2015, the rate-based percent emissions reduction for a state as required by the
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issues of the state’s congressional representatives and how the
state had voted in the 2012 presidential election were much
more predictive of whether a state would oppose the EPA’s
proposal or join in the lawsuits against it, as compared to
whether the state depended on coal-fired generation or faced
deep CO2 cuts under the CPP.29
Further, the study found that sometimes state political
opposition to the CPP seemed contrary to the state’s economic
interests. For example, the Texas Attorney General (along with
his counterpart inWest Virginia) undertook to lead a nationwide
coalition against the CPP for the stated purposes of protecting
grid reliability and preventing increases in consumer electric
bills.30 The State of Texas, however, would benefit significantly
by a national move away from coal-fired to natural gas-fired
production, as well as to renewables (particularly wind power).
Texas has roughly 23 percent of the nation’s natural gas
reserves,31 and its wind-generation capacity is the largest in the
nation.32 Moreover, by 2014, both natural gas and wind power
generation have become less expensive than coal power
generation.33 As David Spence, an energy regulation professor at
the University of Texas, commented:
It’s a contradiction . . . It seems as though political ideology is driving
a lot of the positions being taken by states and state
institutions . . . because clearly Texas will sell a lot of natural gas to a
lot of power plants all over the country, who will be generating more
CPP, and the percentage of a given state’s electricity generation from coal-fired power
plants in 2014).
29 Id. at 34–35 (“Democratic-leaning states are more likely to support the CPP
than are more Republican-leaning states, and likewise . . . more politically pro-
environmental states are more likely to support the CPP than less pro environmental
states. . . . [T]he effect of . . . economic variables [such as reliance on coal-fired
generation and required emissions reductions under the CPP] is less persistent and
strongly significant across models than the effect of the political factors . . . , and the
magnitude of coefficients is smaller.”).
30 Lauren McGaughy, Texas Sues EPA Over Clean Power Plan, CHRON (Oct.
23, 2015, 11:58 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/texas-epa-federal-
lawsuit-ken-paxton-carbon-6586330.php [https://perma.cc/7M52-NK28].
31 A Look at Natural Gas Production in Texas, STATEIMPACT, https://stateim
pact.npr.org/texas/tag/natural-gas-production-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/K7DY-TBXK].
32 Texas State Energy Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(last updated Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=TX [https://perma.cc/9GPT-
D6A6] (“Texas leads the nation in wind-powered generation capacity . . . .”).
33 See Comparing the Costs of Renewable and Conventional Energy Sources,
ENERGY INNOVATION (Feb. 7, 2015), http://energyinnovation.org/2015/02/07/levelized-
cost-of-energy/ [https://perma.cc/96MY-WE3C]. By 2014, solar and wind power had
started to win on price over coal-fired and even natural gas-fired power plants. See Diane
Cardwell,SolarandWindEnergyStart toWinonPrice vs.ConventionalFuels,N.Y.TIMES (Nov.
23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/business/energy-environment/solar-and-wind-
energy-start-to-win-on-price-vs-conventional-fuels.html [https://perma.cc/NY2L-JVX8].
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often because of the Clean Power Plan, yet we are opposing the Clean
Power Plan.34
So, there’s a nutshell of the roiling political economy of the EPA’s
proposed clean power plan. But what about the large investor-
owned utilities, the largest segment of the power industry? The
IOUs, which supply electricity to more than 60 percent of U.S.
consumers, were muted in their response to the EPA’s proposal.
Rather than presenting a united front of opposition or a list of
specific criticisms, they gave a tepid, mixed reaction to the plan,
even as the plan promised over the coming decade to transform
the way the power industry generates, transmits, and
distributes electric power. That surprised me!
II. RESPONSE BY INVESTOR-OWNEDUTILITIES
I was curious. What was the story of how the IOUs had
responded to the EPA’s proposal?
As of 2015, investor-owned utilities had come to dominate
the increasingly concentrated U.S. power industry. The twelve
largest IOUs—the sample on which I base this essay—operated in
twenty-eight states and served 60million customers (about half the
national total), with a generating capacity of 334 gigawatts (more
than half the national total) and annual revenues of $195 billion.35
They seemed to be the 800-pound gorilla in the room.
34 Mose Buchele, Texas Power Players Sit Out Political Opposition To Clean
Power Plan, NPR (Apr. 16, 2016, 8:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/16/474462519/
texas-power-players-sit-out-political-opposition-to-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/
P7L6-LVCR].
35 I have created a “web repository” of materials on which this essay is based.
This repository, on a Google Drive accessible to anyone with the following URL, contains
easily-accessible and downloadable PDFs of the responses of the twelve sampled
companies to the EPA proposal. See https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1AQZ1k1tvhn
C2ciq1D6ZT9rL5QmfY9L9i. Specifically, the Google Drive includes:
• each company’s 10-K filings for fiscal year 2014 (https://drive.google.com/
drive/folders/1Bncl_dONPRe0PB58ljuzLYK94KfitWKO)
• each company’s comments submitted to the EPA on the proposed Clean
Power Plan (https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1njgfJfAhf1Hmmm9Ff
TPxcPTZhyWlxNOi)
• each company’s CSR report for the period during which the CPP proposal
was under review (June 2014 to August 2015) (https://drive.google.com/
drive/folders/1oG7WKaR_W2cnasehDEUgmh0aQ41Krs0e)
In addition to these primary source documents, the Google Drive includes: (1) a table
with demographic information about the twelve sampled companies, including the
headquarters, states of operation, number of electricity customers, electric generating
capacity, and revenues; (2) a chart summarizing the various positions taken by each of
the sampled companies to the EPA proposal, along with links to the relevant documents;
and (3) more-detailed research memos that analyze each of the company’s responses to
the EPA proposal. See https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1icjbIdSVqAjDIbLVp4Wp
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Individually and collectively, the twelve IOUs responded
to the EPA proposal with a cacophony of voices.36 Although the
industry’s Electric Edison Institute (EEI) submitted comments
to the EPA, there did not seem to be a coordinated, united front
by the industry.37 Instead, some of the IOUs stated their support
for the EPA’s proposal; others gave mixed support, often
commenting on how the plan failed to address the particular
bVx9jqNpoQO2. My purpose in creating this web repository on a Google Drive was to
provide easy access to readers and researchers to these materials, some of which (such
as CSR reports for 2014–2015) are no longer available on the Internet. Rather than the
usual “on file with the author” parenthetical in a citation, using the Google Drive allows
for anyone inclined to dig into the documents that this essay considers to review the
primary documents and the research memos on which I base my thoughts.
36 These responses can be found at a clunky government website. See
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrow
ser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-
0602 [https://perma.cc/JRR2-CVKC]. For easier access, the EPA comments by these
IOUs, along with their 2015 10-K filings (covering the period of the EPA proposal), and
their 2015 CSR filings (also for this same period), can be found on the public Google Drive
links I have created. See supra, note 35.
37 The industry group representing investor-owned electric utilities, the
Edison Electric Institute, submitted comments to the EPA proposal, which were
generally non-committal. Neither supporting nor opposing the overall EPA proposal, the
EEI reminded the agency of the importance of its members (which “provide electricity
for 220 million Americans . . . in all [fifty] states”) and their “commit[ment] to providing
safe, reliable, affordable and increasingly clean electricity to all customers.” EDISON
ELECTRIC. INST., COMMENTS OF THEEDISONELECTRIC INSTITUTE ONCARBONPOLLUTION
EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING AND STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY
GENERATING UNITES, DOCKET NO. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 cover letter (2014)
(comment letter available in web suppository). The EEI explained that the EPA proposal
would require “dramatic changes” and an “accelerated a transition” to cleaner forms of
generation, raising “concerns” about “affordable, reliable electricity to customers.” Id.
The EEI’s comments were framed as a set of “suggestions” to ensure the EPA’s emission
rate goals could be met without compromising affordability and reliability, while the
Institute offered to continue “our dialog with the Agency on this complex and significant
rulemaking.” Id. The EEI’s 296-page comment on the EPA proposal sidestepped the issue
of the proposal’s legality, pointing out that the “EPA’s novel ‘systems’ approach” for
states, utilities and consumers to achieve the targeted emission reductions “eventually
will be addressed by the inevitable litigation.” Id. at 9. Without endorsing the EPA’s
approach, the EEI left to “individual entities” to address the state-specific guidelines. Id.
at 10. The tension in the EEI comment was palpable. While offering specific (often useful)
suggestions to “mitigate concerns about the impact of the guidelines” on member
utilities, the EEI emphasized it was not “endorsing” the guidelines. Id. at 9. The EEI
comment thus focused primarily on giving the states (and their utilities) a longer “glide
path” to implement the proposed CO2 reductions. Id. at 12–16. In the end, the EEI
comment seemed a hodge-podge collection of criticisms, suggestions and occasionally
platitudes on the EPA proposal, reflecting the different (and varying) views of the
Institute’s members. In addition to recommending a less stringent implementation
timeline, the EEI urged that nuclear power plants (along with lower-emission natural
gas power plants under construction and imported hydropower) be recognized in a state’s
emission goals, that states be able to “bank” already-existing moves toward renewables,
that states be given flexibility in adopting energy-efficiency programs, that multi-state
compliance plans be facilitated, and that electrification (such as of transportation) be
given credit. Id. at 16–24.
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company’s historic and changing fuel mix; others opposed the
plan, though to varying degrees.
On the other hand, in their 10-K filings with the SEC, the
IOUs offered a more common narrative. While some of the IOUs
identified their pleasure or displeasure with the EPA plan, most
did not, and instead merely recited a stock summary of the plan
and indicated that, after its finalization and possible
implementation, the plan might have a material effect on the
company’s financial position.
In their CSR reports, the IOUs presented a host of
attitudes, generally quite different from those presented by the
companies to the EPA and the SEC. Some went to lengths to
identify how their business was in the process of transformation
in response to environmental and customer concerns about CO2
emission; others identified how the company had already begun
to implement the basic building blocks of the EPA proposal,
moving away from coal-fired generation to natural gas and
renewables, along with a commitment to fostering greater
customer efficiency. None of the sampled companies mentioned
in their CSR reports their regulatory or financial concerns about
the EPA proposal, concerns often raised in their EPA comments
or 10-K filings.
The “triplespeak” that these twelve largest investor-
owned utilities engaged in during the year between the EPA’s
proposal and the plan’s finalization reflected palpably different
political perspectives. In their EPA comments, many of the
utilities generally criticized the EPA for overstepping—even
transgressing—its role as environmental regulator, thus
introducing chaos to utility operations and risking orderly power
supplies. In their SEC filings, the utilities’ disclosures about the
proposed EPA plan generally revolved around the risks of the
proposed government intrusion into power markets and the
uncertainties it would create for the companies’ financial/business
models. In their CSR reports, the same utilities highlighted their
environmental records, their concern for the well-being of their
customers and other stakeholders, and their ongoing plans to
respond to the threat of climate change—often failing to mention
the regulatory concerns over the proposal (the general thread in
the EPA comments) or the financial risks raised by the EPA plan
(the gist of the SEC filings).
Thus, the utilities alternatively used the moral language of
political conservatives, libertarians and progressives in their
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response to the EPA proposal.38 In their EPA comments, the
utilities generally used the moral language of political
conservatives, identifying their obligations to provide economical
and reliable power to their customers, while questioning the EPA
plan to upset traditional state-based utility regulation and to
potentially degrade the power grid. In their SEC filings, the
utilities generally used themoral language of political libertarians,
focusing on the risks that (federal) government intervention posed
to efficient power markets and the way in which the EPA
threatened the freedom of utilities to best determine how to match
energy supplies and customer demand. Yet, in their CSR reports,
the utilities generally used the moral language of political
progressives, pointing to their conscientious efforts already
underway to shift away from fossil fuels and toward renewables,
thus to protect the environment and respond to the impending
harm of climate change.
In short, the utilities’ responses to the EPA proposal
generally were conservative in their comments to the EPA
(asserting the values of U.S. federalism and traditional utility
regulation), libertarian in their SEC-filed 10-K reports
(asserting the values of business freedom), and progressive in
their CSR reports (asserting the values of protecting consumers
and the environment). While each of the largest investor-owned
utilities exhibited its own “moral matrix”—some more
conservative, some more libertarian, and some more
progressive—none of them (except perhaps Berkshire Hathaway
Energy) adopted an integrated, coherent, singular moral stance
on the EPA plan.39 That is, each utility company’s stated moral
positions often reflected all three perspectives in different
38 A chart summarizing of the responses to the EPA proposal by the twelve
sampled IOUs can be found in the “web repository” for this essay. See Summary Chart,
https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1icjbIdSVqAjDIbLVp4WpbVx9jqNpoQO2. The
chart identifies each company’s general statements about the EPA proposal in the
company’s 10-K filing with the SEC for fiscal year 2014, its comments submitted to the
EPA, and its CSR report (sometimes labeled “corporate accountability” or
“sustainability” report) for the 2014–2015 period. In addition, research memos prepared
by Cara Van Dorn and Alex Thompson, my excellent research assistants, describing the
various responses by each company to the EPA proposal can also be found in the web
repository. See Responses by Investor-Owned Utilities to EPA’s Proposed Clean Power
Plan, https://drive.google.com/file/d/14gYUjzmRKvRb7E_YA0qmBWwpbL9Tth6z/view.
39 The relative integrity of the Berkshire Hathaway voice may reflect the
company’s relatively non-bureaucratic structure in which responsibility for the company’s
operational units is concentrated in a single person. See Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Berkshire’s Disintermediation: A Managerial Model for the Next Generation, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 509, 509–10, 521 (2015) (describing the disintermediated governance
structure at the company in which ultimate responsibility is delegated to one individual in
charge of each of the company’s different business units).
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formats and to different audiences—and all essentially at the
same time.
III. A DALLIANCE INMORAL PSYCHOLOGY
What was happening? To better understand this
“corporate triplespeak”—which may reflect a characteristic of
modern corporate personhood that extends well beyond the
investor-owned utility industry—it is useful to turn to moral
structures that have been identified by social psychology and its
relatively nascent sub-field of moral psychology.
A. Haidt’s Moral Foundations
Over the past couple decades, studies and experiments
have revealed that our moral judgments and discourse arise
from a moral matrix, different for each person that mixes and
matches fundamental moral values that can be expressed as
opposites, each along a separate axis:40
care / harm
fairness / cheating
liberty / oppression
loyalty / betrayal
authority / subversion
sanctity / degradation
According to these studies, we humans weight these
values in different ways—often based on the social or political
group with which we identify.41 In this country, self-identified
40 See generally JONATHANHAIDT, THERIGHTEOUSMIND:WHYGOODPEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BYPOLITICS ANDRELIGION (2012). A summary of “moral foundations theory” can be
found in another essay of mine on a similar topic. See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Corporate
Governance as Moral Psychology, 74 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1119 (2017).
41 If you’re curious, you can answer some questions and obtain your “moral
foundations” profile at MoralFoundations.org. MORAL FOUNDATIONS, Moral
Foundations.org [https://perma.cc/T6FD-TPPY]. Here’s mine (the far-left bars), which
was generally more “progressive” (the middle bars), though with some tendencies toward
“conservative” (the far-right bars). I seem to place less value in loyalty, authority,
sacredness—at least as understood by U.S. political conservatives:
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political liberals are moved almost exclusively by the values of
caring/compassion and fairness/equality, with adherents feeling
strong (even visceral) reactions against narratives of harm and
inequality.42 Meanwhile, political conservatives are moved by
the additional values of loyalty, authority/order, and sanctity,
with adherents experiencing strong reactions against narratives
involving disloyalty, disrespect, and desecration.43 And, political
libertarians are moved primarily by the value of liberty/freedom,
with strong reactions against government (or other) coercion
that restricts individual freedom and collective free markets.44
The following schematics from Haidt’s The Righteous
Mind identify the different weights these moral values hold for
American liberals, conservatives, and libertarians:45
42 See Jesse Graham et al., Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets
of Moral Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY, 1029, 1029–46 (2009).
43 Id.
44 HAIDT, supra note 40, at 302.
45 Id. at 297–308.
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Further, as each political group self-reinforces its own
value matrix, the group’s views are purified and harden as the
group members “bind” together and then become “blind” to the
other.46 Thus, each political camp—which for the past fifty years
has become more compartmentalized and purer—is built upon a
46 Besides, better facts tend to be counterproductive on hot-button issues like
gun control.
As Tali Sharot notes in her book “The Influential Mind,” when you present
people with evidence that goes against their deeply held beliefs, the evidence
doesn’t sway them. Instead, they invent more reasons [to buttress the view
that] their prior position was actually correct. The smarter a person is, the
greater his or her ability to rationalize and reinterpret discordant information,
and the greater the polarizing boomerang effect is likely to be.
David Brooks, Guns and the Soul of America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/guns-soul-of-america.html [https://perma.cc/
YZN4-H7KV].
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set of “moral foundations” that constitute the camp’s moral
matrix.47 For progressives, the defining account is “oppressed
versus protected,” using narratives that value compassion and
fairness in a struggle against hatred and inequality. For
conservatives, the defining account is “traditional versus
radical,” built on narratives that value ordered authority built
on deeply-held (often religious) views. For libertarians, the
defining account is “free markets versus regulatory
intervention,” using narratives of individual and collective
liberty struggling against the tyranny of regulatory (public and
private) intrusion and coercion.
Using different narratives, moral psychologists have
conducted experiments that gauge the responses to different
moral narratives given by adherents to each group. Members of
different groups react strongly to different narratives:48
Political
group
Narrative Evoking Strongest
Response
Values
Triggered
Progressive A man walks down a sidewalk and
kicks a dog sleeping on the side of the
sidewalk.
Caring, fairness
Conservative A woman finds an old American flag in
her attic and cuts it into rags to clean
the toilet.
Loyalty, authority,
sanctity
Libertarian A parent, whose gambling hurts their
family, is jailed for being a compulsive
gambler.
Personal freedom
The studies on how people react to these and similar
stories reveal that our moral views are mostly emotive, even
instinctual—and happen almost instantly, often subconsciously.49
These studies find that human decision-making appears to arise
from two cognitive systems: System 1 is quick and intuitive, and
47 See Jonathan Haidt, The Psychology of Self-Righteousness, ONBEING:
PODCAST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://onbeing.org/programs/jonathan-haidt-the-psychology-
of-self-righteousness-oct2017/ [https://perma.cc/5U3W-KB6L] (transcript of interview
between Jonathan Haidt and OnBeing Host, Krista Trippet discussing the increasing
polarization of American political parties for the past several decades).
48 The first two narratives are from Haidt. HAIDT, supra note 40, at 19; Jesse
Graham & Jonathan Haidt, Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations
Approach 14 (n.d.), http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/symposium/hspsp/2010/documents/01-
graham.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JCU-9WNT]. The third is one that I came up with, based
on the suggestion of libertarian Ron Paul.
49 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012); Daniel Kahneman,
Why We Contradict Ourselves and Confound Each Other, ONBEING: PODCAST (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://onbeing.org/programs/daniel-kahneman-why-we-contradict-ourselves-and-confound-
each-other-oct2017/ [https://perma.cc/JD22-88EM] (transcript of interview between Daniel
Kahneman and OnBeing Host, Krista Trippet).
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System 2 is slow and considered.50 The studies indicate that our
moral positions and actions arise through System 1 and then are
explained and defended by System 2, which seems to engage in
motivated reasoning (like that of a zealous, close-minded defense
lawyer) rather than constructive reasoning (like that of an
objective, fair-minded judge).51
Motivated reasoning. That is, our moral explanations
(rationalizations) come only after arriving at a moral conclusion
about a given situation. Thus, these studies address and answer
the age-old question of whether we are essentially rational
beings who sometimes must tame our emotions, or whether we
are emotional beings who use reason to justify our actions and
beliefs. The resounding answer from the studies is that, at least
with respect to moral judgments on how we respond to other
humans, we are emotional beings who come to moral views
based on a moral matrix that we are often unaware of and that
we often take from the moral group to which we are aligned. And
only after coming to a moral conclusion do we then rationalize
our view by resorting to the language sets provided by each of
the fundamental moral values.
The studies also suggest that value matrices tend to
harden into psychological (perhaps even neurologically-based)
attitudes. For example, conservatives tend to like order and
predictability (both attributes of tradition and authority), while
liberals tend to like variety and diversity (both attributes of
tolerance and liberty). Thus, when shown dots moving on a
screen, conservatives prefer the images of dots moving in lock
step, while liberals prefer random movement.
In addition, liberals tend to be universalists who view
people everywhere in the world as relevant to their moral
50 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 19–30 (providing overview of two systems and,
among other illustrations, identifyingSystem1as the automatic activity of driving a car down
a road and System 2 as parking a car in a narrow space); see also Kahneman, supra note 49.
51 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 45, 49, 103 (describing System 1 as “intuitive
and impulsive,” and System 2 as “capable of reasoning,” but also “lazy”, and asserting
that “[i]n the context of attitudes . . . System 2 is more an apologist for the emotions of
System 1 than a critic of those emotions” and when “System 1 is involved the conclusion
comes first and the arguments follow.”); see also Kahneman, supra note 49. Of course,
judges may also engage in motivated reasoning to defend their moral decisions. See
KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 45, 49, 103 (describing use of “critical reasoning” to explain
one’s views). The insights from moral psychology have profound implications for the law
and legal education. See Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason?
Arguments for an Argumentative Theory, BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57, 57 (2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090 [https://perma.cc/ZV4N-
TFD4] (concluding that the “function of reasoning should be rethought,” given that
reasoning arises not to improve knowledge and decisions, but instead to provide
supportive argumentation; this explains the “confirmation bias” in which erroneous
beliefs persist because reasoning is designed to merely confirm one’s pre-existing beliefs).
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equation, sometimes even more than people nearby, while
conservatives are more parochial staying focused on people in
their country or their self-defined communities. Thus, political
policies aimed to improve the lives of people generally in the
world resonate with liberals, while those same policies when
presented to conservatives both have less salience and suggest
disloyalty to one’s own.
Likewise, the studies suggest liberals are more open to
new experiences, while conservatives have trouble assimilating
to modernity. That is, liberals exhibit the trait of being willing
to accept and accommodate to change, while conservatives
remain cautious and prefer the predictability of tradition.
Moving beyond one’s moral matrix. Change is not
easy. This is particularly true when we do not see how our
context drives our views. Thus, “facts” often don’t matter—we
will have a compendium of rationalizations to avoid, explain, or
simply avoid uncomfortable truths. That is, expounding a
message is not the road to change. Instead, given that our moral
views arise from the context of our social surroundings, change
will happen only if the messenger changes.
Even though some studies suggest that techniques such
as “debiasing” stereotypes can make constructive reasoning
possible,52 there is an axis we tend to automatically turn to
without thinking.53 If we actually think, it can be different, but
as Daniel Kahneman persuasively argues in Thinking, Fast and
Slow, we do this far less often than we realize.54
Reflecting on our ability to recognize our own intuitive,
emotional thinking (System 1 thinking) and change ourselves,
Daniel Kahneman is not optimistic:
Well, what is disappearing, or seems to be disappearing, is a culture of
debates between diverse opinions. . . . What can be done is
superficial . . . so teaching statistics to the young would be useful,
52 Scott O. Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati, & Kristin Landfield, Giving Debiasing
Away Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human
Welfare? 4 PERS. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 390, 393, 395 (2009), https://www3.nd.edu/~ghaeffel/
Lilienfeld2009%20Perspectives%20on%20Psychological%20Science.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q5T5-NCXJ].
53 ARNOLD KLING, THREE LANGUAGES OF POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS
POLITICAL DIVIDES (2017). Kling uses a sports analogy (the football audible) to how
political groups use language “to solidify in-group relations while separating one ideology
from another.” Mark Charles, Book Review of Arnold Kling’s Three Languages of Politics:
Talking Across Political Divides (2013), AMAZON (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.amazon.co
m/gp/customer-reviews/R3SX0VXZ4G9NOY/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_
viewpnt?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1944424466#R3SX0VXZ4G9NOY [https://perma.cc/9RXE-48S7].
54 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 44–49 (identifying our “monitor and control”
System 2 as being lazy, and when “System 1 is involved, the conclusion comes first and
the arguments follow”).
2018] CORPORATE TRIPLESPEAK 1003
teaching economics to the young would be useful, teaching self-critical
thinking, or better yet, how to criticize other people, because this is more
pleasant and more interesting . . . . But those are very marginal
improvements. When it comes to the big issues, I’m not very optimistic.55
And change in others may be even harder. In fact, presenting
facts to someone who does not share your views may even be
counterproductive. According to recent studies, when people are
presented with evidence that goes against their deeply held
beliefs, they are not swayed by the evidence. Instead, they invent
more reasons to justify their prior position as correct. In fact,
smarter people exhibit greater ability to rationalize and
reinterpret information at odds with their beliefs—thus “the
greater the polarizing boomerang effect is likely to be.”56
Comparison to “Critical Legal Studies.” The insight
that our moral judgments are intuitive, emotional and
instantaneous goes beyond the movement in the law academy in
the 1970s and 1980s that framed legal decisions—especially
those by judges—as arising from an unstated purpose to advance
a social theory, specifically one enabling and preserving
dominant social hierarchies.57 Moral psychology does not build
on a particular social theory. Instead, it identifies that social
theories (or structures) arise from prevailing moral matrices
held by individuals in a society or political group. That is, unlike
the critical legal studies (CLS) critique that legal institutions
(and their methods of rule-making and interpretation) are built
on undemocratic motives of class domination, moral psychology
does not assume a particular institutional design.
The CLS movement, however, has some parallels to the
insights drawn from moral psychology. For one, both reject the
notion that human decision-making (whether moral or legal) is
based on rationality.58 For another, both question whether
individuals or society come to moral decisions (or resolve
disputes) through value-neutral systems of rules and doctrines.
Instead, both agree that our moral discourse (whether
individually or in law) is largely “mere rationalizations of the
55 Id.
56 David Brooks, Guns and the Soul of America, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/guns-soul-of-america.html [https://perma.cc/
YZN4-H7KV] (describing findings by Tali Sharot in her book, The Influential Mind).
57 See Jonathan Turley, Introduction, The Hitchhikers Guide to CLS, Unger,
and Deep Thought, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 594–95 (1987) (describing the movement’s
premise that identifying “hidden interests and class domination of legal institutions”
would first “unravel” legal institutions built on political domination, thus to build
institutions focused on “progressive change”).
58 GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1095 (3d ed. 2008).
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status quo.”59 Thus, CLS mirrors the conclusions of moral
psychology that we (including judges) cannot transcend our
social, political, and economic contexts—our moral views
inextricably linked to our operating “social theory” (to use the
language of the “crits”) or our “moral matrix” (to use the
language of Haidt).60
The CLS movement saw as its mission to expose and
educate the elites—especially judges—who would come to reflect
on the value-laden nature of the law and, coming to their senses,
adopt a more progressive (just and compassionate) understanding
of the law’s purpose. That is, the CLS was a decidedly political
movement, reflecting the then-prevailing assumption that the only
true moral values were those of caring and fairness, universally
applied.61 The notion that social (and political) cohesion, resilience,
and success could come from loyalty, authority, and tradition was
antithetical (even unimaginable) to the crits—as it was also to
social psychologists of the same era.62 Thus, the crits clung to the
agenda (one that proved untenable) of convincing judges that
their unstated and wayward conservative moral matrices, on
reflection, should give way to an explicit and enlightened
progressive moral matrix.63
B. Corporate Moral Speech
Moral speech within corporations seems lately to be on
the rise. Business leaders regularly talk in moral terms, often
referring to many of the moral values that arise in political
59 Turley, supra note 57, at 597 (“CLS scholars, like Kennedy, reject suggestions
that law is neutral and apolitical as apologetic, mere rationalizations of the status quo.”); see
also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209,
354 (1979). See Allan C. Hutchinson et al., Law Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984) (attacking
legal formalism as “simply politics dressed in different garb”); see also CHRISTIE & MARTIN,
supra note 58, at 1091.
60 CHRISTIE & MARTIN, supra note 58, at 1094 (section C on Formalism).
61 Jesse Graham et al.,Mapping the Moral Domain, 101 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL.
366, 366, (2011) (describing how social psychologists, before recent insights from studies in
moral psychology, assumed that morality is about “how well or poorly individuals treated
other individuals”—which boiled down to “justice, rights, and welfare”).
62 See Lawrence Kohlberg, From is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic
Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT ANDEPISTEMOLOGY 151–235 (Theodore Mischel ed., New York: Academic
Press 1971) (viewing moral rationalizations based on authority, loyalty, and tradition as
“immature and unconventional,” reflecting a stunted moral development stuck in a “law
and order” ethos).
63 The parallel to the religious right’s attempts to convince young gay people
to go straight seems inescapable. See John Paulk, To Straight and Back, POLITICO (June
19, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/life-as-ex-ex-gay-paulk-
108090 [https://perma.cc/BK58-AARR].
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decision-making and discourse. For example, many business
publications and websites offer their business readers
“workplace morality tales” whose lessons are framed in terms of
empathy, fairness, loyalty, and larger (sacred) purpose.64
The long-prevailing view had been that corporate
decisions, like other human decisions, occurred as a rational
fact-gathering process in which a business reality was
constructed and then, after appropriate deliberation, responded
to. But with the insights from moral psychology that “most
ethical judgment relies more on emotionally laden intuition,”
those who study institutional decision-making are re-thinking
the question.65 Rather than accepting the “bounded rationality”
of institutional decisions—that is, the notion that institutional
decisions are rational, but often based on limited information—
there is an emerging focus on the institutional conditions (or the
context in which business decisions are made). That is, just as
context is what drives moral decisions by individuals,
institutional context appears to be the driver of institutional
moral decision-making. Thus, for example, corporate decision
making on chief executive officer (CEO) pay appears to be
principally shaped by institutional underpinnings, where “bad
barrels” can poison corporate decision-making, just as “good
barrels” can guide such decisions.66
But the discourse about the moral dimension of corporate
decision-making—which continues to be described as “corporate
ethics”—is almost entirely focused on conscious recognition of
conflicts, overcoming cognitive biases, re-conceiving business
goals, recognizing “motivated blindness,” stepping off the
64 See, e.g., Adam Bryant, Corner Office N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
column/corner-office [https://perma.cc/Q4GG-N4L3] (weekly interviews in the New York
Times’ Sunday business section on lessons learned from CEOs); Adam Bryant, How to
Be a CEO, from a Decade’s Worth of Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/10/27/business/how-to-be-a-ceo.html [https://perma.cc/NU47-EZBX] (based
on interviews of 525 CEOs, identifying that successful CEOs explain their success by
engaging in a range of moral vectors—namely, caring about others, being concerned
about fairness, fomenting freedom in the workplace, showing loyalty, creating a sense of
order, and respecting the sacredness of people); Vivian Giang, 7 Business Leaders Share
How They Solved the Biggest Moral Dilemmas of Their Careers, FASTCOMPANY (June 2,
2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3046630/7-business-leaders-share-how-they-solved-
the-biggest-moral-dilemmas-of-their [https://perma.cc/9BPE-93TQ] (describing moral
dilemmas in business situations, such as risking being fired for restoring funds to
employee investment accounts or telling a client about a mistake, and the lessons
learned: empathize with those affected by business decisions, avoid harming others,
reciprocate loyalty, consider larger goal of long-term value, treat all customers fairly).
65 See Emily S. Block & Edward Conlon, Institutional Logics and Individual
Ethical Judgment, in INEQUALITY, TRUST AND ETHICS CONFERENCE: LONDON 2015
(Abstract 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2607645 [https://
perma.cc/KLU8-PWG8].
66 Id.
1006 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
“slippery slope,” and becoming aware of “blind spots.”67 The
possibility that we don’t recognize what we can’t see is lost in the
stories of how business leaders have lacked sufficient clarity of
vision in particular situations.
IV. CORPORATE TRIPLESPEAK IN PRACTICE—DUKE ENERGY
Corporate responses to the EPA’s proposed clean power plan
were not uniform, and hardly monolithic. For example, comments
on the EPA’s proposed clean power plan by IOUs ranged from
appreciation (Berkshire Hathaway) to smoldering, even livid
resistance (SouthernCompany).68 Likewise, in their 10-K filings, the
disclosures spanned a spectrum from a cockiness that the CPP
played into the company’s strategic fuel-mix planning (NewEra and
Exelon) to a deer-in-the-headlights bewilderment about where new
GHG regulation might lead the company (PPL and Duke Energy).69
And the companies’ CSR reports sometimes seemed green-washing
pabulum (FirstEnergy) and other times heart-felt contemplations
about the company’s role in our energy future (PG&E).70
Using the insights from moral psychology and the
identification of the moral matrices of American liberals/
progressives, conservatives and libertarians, this essay turns
next to the specific moral positions and rationalizations used by
the investor-owned utility companies.71 Specifically, the
following considers the corporate triplespeak engaged in by the
largest of the IOUs, Duke Energy.72 The company’s mixed
67 Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/04/ethical-breakdowns [https://perma.cc/BPQ5-
B7S6] (concluding that most unethical corporate behavior arises because
“employees bend or break ethics rules because those in charge are blind to unethical
behavior and may even unknowingly encourage it.”).
68 See Comments, supra note 35. In fact, the Southern Company was identified
by the Union of Concerned Scientists as being at the “forefront of disinformation
campaigns targeting climate science” and a “staunch opponent” of the EPA’s actions on
climate change, lobbying state attorneys general to set aside the Clean Power Plan.
Who’s Fighting the Clean Power Plan and EPA Action on Climate Change, supra note 8.
69 See 10-K filings, supra note 35.
70 See CSR reports, supra note 35.
71 I use Haidt’s moral values framework and his six identified “moral values”
as a metric, but not as an assertion that these are the only moral values that underlie
our moral (or corporate) decisions. In fact, Haidt and others acknowledge that other
moral values may be at play in human decision-making. I’m sure this is right. For me,
it’s curious that “love” is missing from the mix. But that’s entirely another inquiry: “love
as a corporate value!” See László Zsolnai, Genuine Business Ethics (2007), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983788 [https://perma.cc/WAX4-TTH4].
72 In 2014, Duke Energy (through its electric utility subsidiaries) provided
electrical service to 7.2 million retail, commercial, and industrial customers in North
Carolina, Florida, Kentucky and Ohio. Its service area in the Southeast and Midwest
had a total population of 21 million. With annual revenues of $23.5 billion, it was in 2015
the largest investor-owned utility in the United States. See Comments of Duke Energy
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responses to the EPA proposal were typical, reflecting both an
ambivalence about the EPA’s proposal and remarkably different
moral vectors in the company’s 10-K filing, its comments submitted
to the EPA, and its contemporaneous CSR report.
Although Duke Energy (along with a few other of the
large investor-owned utilities) helped fund conservative political
groups that launched shrill political attacks on the EPA’s plan,
the company itself was noticeably non-committal—largely
posturing with different political-oriented groups in different
ways, working with the EPA to fine-tune the proposal, and
taking a wait-and-see attitude. That is, whatever its public
statements about the EPA proposal, its actual behavior
suggested that the company had not resolved which voice
directed its actions.
A. SEC Filings: Mostly Libertarian
In looking at the 10-K disclosures by the sample investor-
owned utilities on the EPA proposal, one finds a focus principally
on the risks of the plan to the companies’ profitability. Although
some of the 10-K filings describe the companies’ opposition to or
support for the plan in their comments to the EPA, most of the
10-K filings stick to the SEC’s current disclosure philosophy
(and disclosure items) that companies identify risks to
operations and profitability.
Perhaps not surprisingly, though tellingly, none of the
sampled 10-K filings revealed any discussion by these large
investor-owned utilities that their business model faced possible
extinction. With the advent of less expensive solar-and wind-
powered generation, much of it distributed throughout the grid,
and the ever-growing expense and possible obsolescence of
massive, capital-intensive power generation plants (coal,
natural gas, nuclear), the business model of centralized electric
generation, transmission and distribution appears to be headed
toward a “slow train wreck.”73 Perhaps on the minds of far-
on the Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units; Proposed Rule at 1 (Dec. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Duke Energy
Comment Letter], https://drive.google.com/open?id=1dLWPL_rozrtXMqOV5D-QmGvE3
JBpIZAe; List of IOUs, https://drive.google.com/open?id=15v34oKO8AHlZW2vPQLTOj
zHKImexYiuz.
73 The fundamental changes at work in the electric utility industry, including
those affecting the investment cycle, were well-recognized at the time of the EPA’s
proposal. See Rod Kuckro, ‘Major Investment Cycle’ and Rapidly Changing U.S. Energy
Markets Pose Fresh Challenges for FERC—Chairman LaFleur, ENERGYWIRE, (Aug. 22,
2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060004814 [https://perma.cc/6H37-
4NWW]. In fact, the industry acknowledged that falling natural gas prices, as well as
the falling costs for onshore wind, were the drivers of the declining prospects for coal-
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thinking utility executives and investors, this bleak future for
the industry did not make it to the stylized 10-K filings.
Duke Energy filed its 10-K annual report, signed by the
company’s CEO, for the period ending December 31, 2014, on
February 27, 2015.74 Compared to its submitted comments on
the EPA proposal (which were generally negative) and its
discussion of the proposal in the company’s CSR report (which
was more balanced), the SEC filing is somewhat nondescript. It
identifies the existence of the EPA’s proposal, without taking
any position on its merits or demerits. Except for the conclusion
that the EPA plan (once finalized and implemented) “could be
significant” to the company’s utility subsidiaries, the company
does not elucidate its legal or political views on the EPA’s game-
changing plan.
The 10-K addresses the EPA’s proposal only once at page
73 of its 251-page filing under the heading “CO2 Existing Source
Performance Standards and Standards for Reconstructed and
Modified Units.”75 The 10-K describes the date and publication of
the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP), along with a
statement that the company had submitted comments to the EPA
on December 1, 2014.76 The 10-K then describes the potential
impact of the proposed EPA plan as follows:
Once the CPP is finalized, states will be required to develop plans to
implement its requirements. The CPP will not directly impose any
regulatory requirements on Duke Energy Registrants. State
implementation plans will include the regulatory requirements that
will apply to Duke Energy Registrants. Based on the EPA’s June 18,
2014 proposal, states will have from one to three years after the CPP
is finalized to submit a plan for EPA’s review.77
The 10-K continued by describing how the EPA’s proposal called
for phased CO2 emission reductions over the period from 2020 to
2030, but pointed out that the implementation schedule was still
uncertain and “could be significantly different from the
generated electricity. See Rod Kuckro, ‘War on Coal’ Rhetoric Belies Robust Forecast for
Coal-Fired Electricity, ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060
012054 [https://perma.cc/R6HV-CS7G]; see also Christopher Martin & Justin Doom, Wind
Power Without U.S. Subsidy To Become Cheaper Than Gas, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-12/wind-energy-without-subsidy-will-be-c
heaper-than-gas-in-a-decade [https://perma.cc/98A4-8N29].
74 See Duke Energy Corp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act (Form 10-K) at 73 (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archi
ves/edgar/data/17797/000132616015000008/duk-20141231x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/
G2GM-XXTG].
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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proposal.”78 The company also pointed out that it would be
“several years before the requirements of the subsequent state
plans are known.”79 Thus, the company concluded it was “unable
to predict the outcome of this rulemaking, or how it might
impact [the affected Duke Energy companies], but the impact
could be significant.”80
Noticeably missing is any indication that the company
had taken the position in its already-submitted comments on the
EPA proposal that the plan, as proposed, was beyond the EPA’s
authority under the Clean Air Act and that it suffered from
significant policy and technical defects. That is, the company did
not seem to factor into its assessment of the EPA’s plan the
possibility courts might invalidate it.81 Limiting itself to a
description of the proposal and its stated implementation
schedule, the company pointed out only that the plan’s final
requirements, its implementation schedule, and the details of
the state implementation plans were all uncertain—”but the
impact could be significant.”82
Nonetheless, the company’s focus in its 10-K filing on the
uncertainties of the EPA proposal—what the finalized plan will
be, what the state implementation plans will be, what the EPA’s
implementation plan will be (for states that fail to submit their
own plan), and what the implementation schedule will be—
suggested a concern about the risks of the plan to the company’s
utility business model. But the company did not describe how
the plan, as proposed, would change traditional state utility
regulation or specifically how it might have a negative impact on
customers. Instead, the clear (though only lightly sketched)
message was that the new regulation’s effect on the company’s
utility operations—its freedom of action—could be “significant.”
The failure of the 10-K to mention how the EPA plan
might change the traditional regulatory model and the potential
impact on customer rates and service reliability (the
centerpieces of the company’s comments to the EPA) are even
clearer in the next section of the company’s 10-K filing. Under the
heading “Global Climate Change,” the company described the level
of its GHG emissions in 2014, which it said came primarily from
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Arguably, the potential invalidity of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, as
proposed, would seem an “uncertainty” that Duke could reasonably have expected would
have an impact on its continuing operations. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017).
82 Duke Energy Corp., supra note 74, at 73.
1010 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
the company’s “fleet of coal-fired power plants.”83 The company
then said that “futureCO2 emissionswill be influenced by variables
including new regulations, economic conditions that affect
electricity demand, and the [company’s] decisions regarding
generation technologies deployed to meet customer electricity
needs.”84 Although the 10-K explained that the company was
already “taking actions that will result in reduced GHG emissions
over time [thus lowering the company’s] exposure to any future
mandatory GHG emission reduction requirements or carbon tax,”
the company’s utilities “would plan to seek recovery of compliance
costs associated with their regulated operations through
appropriate regulatory mechanisms.”85
In short, the company’s 10-K filing addressed only
whether GHG regulations (including, presumably, the EPA’s
proposed plan) would affect profitability and concluded that
under the traditional utility rate-setting model its utilities
would simply pass on any additional regulatory costs to
customers. That is, the company would itself be free from the
financial impact of the EPA’s plan, given that the plan’s impact
would fall on customers. The 10-K filing, unlike the comments
the company made to the EPA or its stated views in its CSR
report, did not intimate any particular concerns about passing
on higher costs to customers.
The 10-K thus reflects a particularly libertarian attitude
by focusing mostly on one’s own freedom—in the process,
disregarding the harm to others and the departure from
tradition. Although the company’s comments to the EPA would
identify affordable rates and power reliability as a critical (if not
central) value for the company, concern about the potential
impact on customers of the EPA proposal is wholly lacking in the
company’s 10-K filing. This attitude of “my freedom first” is a
defining characteristic of the libertarian value matrix.
B. EPA Comments: Leaning Conservative
In looking at the submitted comments by investor-owned
utilities to the EPA proposal—one discovers a variety of
positions. Across the sampled investor-owned utilities, there
was a spectrum of views. Some companies strongly opposed the
EPA proposal on legal, policy and technical grounds (Southern
Company). Others were more sanguine and, while opposing
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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some aspects of the proposal, also embraced its overall approach
(Con Edison). Yet others showed strong support for the proposal,
recommending ways to strengthen it on legal and technical
grounds (PG&E).
Thus, among the sampled companies, their EPA
comments—compared to their 10-K filings and CSR reports—
revealed the broadest range of divergent views. The levels of
opposition and support also tended to follow the political map,
with the greatest opposition coming from utility companies in
the South (more politically conservative) and the strongest
support from utility companies in the Northeast and West Coast
(more politically liberal). And, in the politically-mixed Midwest,
the utility companies showed greater ambivalence about the
EPA proposal.
Duke Energy’s comments to the EPA, submitted on the
agency’s deadline for making comments of December 1, 2014,
were signed by the company’s Vice President of Environmental
and Energy Policy.86 The company’s comments run a total of 220
pages, not counting an extensive appendix on the estimated
costs of the EPA proposal to the company.87
The company began its EPA comments by invoking the
company’s customers and the importance of producing and
delivering reliable electric service.88 The company next focused on
the tradition of utility regulation being left to the states and the
insufficient congressional delegation under the Clean Air Act to
the EPA to take on this role, pointing out that the EPA’s proposal
“would fundamentally alter how electricity is generated, delivered
and consumed in the country.”89 The company made clear that
electric utility regulation “is a matter typically left to states.”90
Echoing the criticisms of the many opponents of the EPA
proposal, Duke questioned the EPA’s “attempt to establish a
national energy policy through a section of the Clean Air
Act . . . never designed for that purpose.”91 Although the company
86 See Duke Energy Comment Letter, supra note 72 (cover letter from Cari
Boyce, Vice President, Envtl. Energy & Policy).
87 Id.
88 The company stated:
Through our 6 regulated utilities, we produce and deliver electricity to 7.2
million homes and businesses located in six states. About 21 million people
depend on us to keep their lights and air conditioning on, not to mention the
hospitals, airports, commercial businesses, and manufacturers who depend on
us for reliable electric service 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Id. at 1–2 (emphasis omitted).
89 Id. at 3.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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did not explain what federal CO2 regulation it had in mind, the
company stated its belief “that creating a national energy policy
would best be accomplished through comprehensive federal
legislation rather than a regulatory approach.”92
The company stated its ongoing commitment to addressing
GHG emissions—while providing customers affordable and
reliable electricity—and identified its investments in new
generation technologies as it began to retire its coal-burning fleet.
While stating its support for “policies that will result in reasonable
decreases in greenhouse gas (‘GHG’) emissions over time,” the
company emphasized that any such reductions should be balanced
with “impacts to our customers’ electric rates, our states’
economies, and the reliability that our customers demand.”93 The
company touted its efforts over the previous decade to modernize
its generation fleet, pointing out that it had “invested over $9B in
new state-of-the art generation, which has allowed the retirement
of over half of our coal fleet (6800 megawatts of capacity).”94 The
company continued, “To date, we have reduced our CO2 emissions
by 20 percent from 2005 levels while also achieving sulfur dioxide
reductions of 84 percent and nitrogen oxides reductions of 63
percent during the same time period.”95 Like other of the large
IOUs, Duke Energy sought to have the EPA recognize its early
action, thus “to ensure that our customers get the full benefit of
these early actions and investments.”96
In short, the company identified a full range of moral
vectors implicated by the EPA proposal. The company stated its
commitment to providing affordable and reliable power to its
customers—a “caring” value. The company also stated its
commitment to a balanced approach to reducing CO2 emissions,
bearing in mind the burdens on customers and “state
economies”—a “fairness” value built on proportionality. The
company also stated its belief that changes to utility regulation,
which had typically resided with the states, should happen only
through federal legislation—an “authority” value. The company
emphasized its commitment to its customers and its concerns
about betraying their trust, both in the actions it had already taken
and its concerns about the EPA proposal—a “loyalty” value.
Although the company would later, in its Sustainability
Report (described below), discuss its commitment to reducing
the company’s carbon footprint and thus to address the broader
92 Id.
93 Id. at 2.
94 Id. (emphasis omitted).
95 Id. at 3.
96 Id.
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impacts of climate change, this universalist caring value is
absent in the company’s comments to the EPA. Instead, the EPA
comments both in their structure and tone are like a court brief
that seeks to create the impression of a balanced, objective
analysis while arguing for a position. Here, perhaps in
recognition of where these arguments would end up—a
tradition-bound, conservative Supreme Court—the centerpiece
of the company’s comments to the EPA is an attack on the
agency’s authority to promulgate its proposed plan:
The CAA was passed more than 40 years ago and was never designed
to implement national energy policy or to deal with the global issues
associated with greenhouse gas emissions. A standard of performance
under section 111 of the CAA must be achievable with adequately
demonstrated, commercially available technology that can be
achieved by the individual regulated sources (coal-fired electric
generating units (“EGUs”)). The EPA’s proposed best system of
emissions reduction (“BSER”) is unprecedented because it proposes to
include the entire electric system, including sources that do not
produce power or any emissions to establish the proposed standards
states must meet. The fundamental departure from established
statutory requirements in the EPA’s Clean Power Plan is the Agency’s
assertion that the BSER for coal-fired EGUs may include measures
that would either directly or indirectly reduce a source’s utilization or
that are not within the control of individual sources. The EPA’s
redefinition of what measures may constitute a “system of emission
reduction” is contrary to over 40 years of the EPA’s consistent
interpretation and implementation of section 111.97
In addition, the company questioned the building blocks and
interim compliance period for the state implementation plans.
Commenting that, despite EPA claims, states have little or no
flexibility to meet the proposed state goals. Among other things,
the company asserted that states would be compelled to retire
coal-fired generating units as the only way to achieve the
proposed state goals. In addition, to avoid reliability problems
and the cost burden of stranded assets, the company argued that
states should be permitted to decide on their own “glide path” for
compliance during the interim period. The comments on the
state implementation plans emphasized the importance of state
autonomy (“tradition” and “liberty”) to decide how to best
balance—presumably in collaboration with the state’s utility
regulator—the issues of grid reliability, timing for retiring old
generation units and bringing online new ones, and meeting the
emission goals set for the state.
97 Id. at 3–4.
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Overall, the company thus situated its EPA comments
squarely in a conservative camp. The focus was on the virtue of
tradition—of staying with the time-tested rituals of electric
utility regulation. The EPA had overstepped its authority by
setting state emission goals, as opposed to emission standards
for individual “electric generating units,” the traditional subjects
of its regulation. For the company, the traditions of energy
federalism—based in the constitutional notions that what is not
federal is for the states—and the delegation doctrine
commanded a nearly sacred stature.
The company’s EPA comments then continued by
identifying various policy and technical flaws with the proposal,
which generally criticized the EPA for being too regulatory.
Specifically, the company stated:
• The proposed interim compliance period (2020-2029) could result in
significant stranded assets for customers.
• The EPA’s assumed 6 percent heat rate improvement target for coal-
fired generation units (Block 1) is unachievable.
• The EPA’s assumed “redispatch” from coal-fired generation units to
natural gas combined cycle units (Block 2) is unachievable.
• The EPA’s proposed treatment of renewables and nuclear power in
setting state goals (Block 3) is inappropriate.
• The EPA’s proposed targets for end-use energy efficiency (Block 4)
are unreasonable.
• The EPA should correct the numerous errors in calculating the state
emission goals, should clarify how combined cycle gas units will be
treated, should use a multi-year historic baseline for setting state goals,
and should clarify how rate-to-mass translations should be made.98
The company concluded by summarizing its criticisms of
the EPA’s assumptions in its building blocks and by reiterating
its various recommendations on the proposal—among them on
determining achievable generation emission targets, removing
nuclear capacity from state goal calculations, and reconsidering
the feasibility efficiency savings rates.
Making clear that its recommendations to improve the
proposal should not be understood as an endorsement of the
EPA’s plan, the company reiterated its view that the EPA plan
exceeded the agency’s authority and usurped the traditional
state regulatory role, and reserved the company’s option to
98 Id. at 4–10.
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challenge the plan, once finalized.99 The EPA’s plan—it seemed
for Duke Energy in its comments to the EPA—was teed up for
review by a conservative Supreme Court.
C. CSR Reports: Clearly Progressive
All of the sampled utilities prepared a CSR report for 2014,
and all of their CSR reports make reference (directly or indirectly)
to the EPA’s proposed clean power plan.100 Interestingly, each
company (except perhaps Berkshire Hathaway) stated a
viewpoint on the EPA’s proposal in its CSR report different from
the company’s stated views in their SEC filings and EPA
comments. In general, the CSR reports focused on company
achievements and plans for cutting GHG emissions and
responding to climate change.101
Thus, while the companies had expressed a range of
views on the EPA’s proposal in their comments to the agency,
each of the companies shifted its attention when discussing the
plan with its public constituents. The CSR reports generally
reflected much less commitment to the traditions of utility
regulation and the industry’s centralized business model.
Although none mentioned (or even hinted) that the companies’
utility business model might be headed toward radical change,
the CSR reports reflected companies that saw themselves in the
midst of transformation as they responded to technological
change, customer demand, and environmental concerns.
That is, CSR reports (far more than the companies’ 10-K
filings or the EPA comments) reflected an acceptance of change,
a hallmark of the progressive mindset. Interestingly, the
99 The company seemed strident in its view that even if the EPA made the
changes suggested, the rule would be legally invalid:
None of these comments offered by Duke Energy, however, should be taken as
an endorsement of or support for any part of the [EPA’s proposal]. The EPA’s
[proposal] first and foremost exceeds the authority of the CAA and must be
withdrawn. Simply tweaking various parts of the [proposal] will not change
that fact. . . . A section 111 standard of performance cannot be based on
“beyond-the-source” actions like mandating the displacement of generation
from coal-fired EGUs with generation from natural gas combined cycle (NGCC)
units, displacing coal-fired generation with renewable energy, and decreasing
electricity demand by increasing end-use energy efficiency. . . .
. . . .
In addition to being unlawful, The Proposed Guidelines are
unconstitutional because they usurp sovereign state authority in violation of
the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 219–20.
100 See CSR Reports, supra note 35.
101 Id.
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companies’ CSR reports also generally acknowledged that they
were also being read by investors, for whom an impending
change in the business model of their utility investments would
be highly material. The CSR reports often included boilerplate
about forward-looking statements designed to insulate
securities information from liability for making predictions or
forecasts that go awry.
Duke Energy’s 2014 “Sustainability Report,” which
includes an introductory letter from its CEO, was prepared by
the company’s Chief Sustainability Officer.102 The report, dated
April 17, 2015, highlighted Duke Energy’s rankings on various
sustainability indices (Dow Jones, Corporate Knights,
Newsweek) and focused on five areas, which it described as its
“Road Ahead”—namely, customers, growth, operations,
environmental metrics, and employees.103
The Sustainability Report includes a discussion of the
EPA’s clean power plan in a five-paragraph section on “Climate
Change”.104 The section begins by restating some language from
the CEO’s letter: “Duke Energy supports climate change policies
that will result in reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
at achievable rates over time while balancing impacts to our
customers’ rates, the economies of our service territories and the
reliability that our customers count on.”105
This policy statement, typical of those by investor-owned
utilities, is useful to unpack to get a sense for its political
impetus. The company exhibits concern about the harm of GHG
emissions—expressing a caring value on avoiding harm to
unnamed persons, and perhaps even the planet, affected by
climate change. The statement also exhibits a concern for
customers, both financially and in terms of service. Thus, it
expresses caring and loyalty values toward customers, while
stating a commitment to maintaining order in power markets.
In short, the company’s overarching statement on the issue of
climate change is a balanced conservative one, similar to the
tone of the EPA comments.
But then the company’s Sustainability Report takes a
turn toward a more progressive description of its actions on
CO2 emissions:
102 DUKEENERGYCORP., 2014SUSTAINABILITYREPORT1 (2015)http://sustainability
report.duke-energy.com/2014/pdfs/2014-duke-sustainability-report-complete.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BCX4-JNF2].
103 Id.
104 Id. at 26–27.
105 Id. at 26.
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We have taken a number of significant actions that have reduced our
CO2 emissions. Clean, innovative, natural gas plants are being built
and many older, less efficient generating units have been retired (with
plans to close more in the future). The company also offers its
customers a variety of energy efficiency and conservation programs to
help them reduce their electricity consumption in a cost-effective
manner. In addition, Duke Energy continues to add wind and solar
power to its generation portfolio.106
Again, it is useful to unpack the language. The company said it
was taking various actions against a perceived harm, including
some actions it described as “innovative” and new—an
expression of progressive caring values. Moreover, the look was
toward the future not bound by the traditional use of older units
or existing patterns of consumption—an expression of a
progressive’s embrace of novelty and against tradition. The
company thus sought to portray itself as not bound by tradition
or loyal to prevailing business methods.
Next, theSustainabilityReportaddressed theEPA’s proposal:
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed
regulating CO2 from new, existing andmodified or reconstructed fossil
fuel plants under section 111 of the Clean Air Act (referred to as the
Clean Power Plan). Duke Energy thinks that creating a national
energy policy would best be accomplished through comprehensive
federal legislation, rather than a regulatory approach like the one
proposed in the EPA’s Clean Power Plan.
Duke Energy established voluntary carbon reduction goals in 2010.
The goals—which were updated in the company’s 2012 Sustainability
Report after the merger between Duke Energy and Progress Energy—
reflect Duke Energy’s aspiration to reduce or offset the company’s
generation fleet CO2 emissions by 17 percent below its 2005 level by
2020. Duke Energy achieved this level of emission reduction earlier
than anticipated. However, the company’s current forecasts suggest it
will experience a gradual increase in CO2 emissions in the years ahead
as the economy continues to recover and the demand for electricity
increases. Fluctuations in fuel prices could also contribute to
increased emissions.107
This reaction to the CPP, which paralleled the company’s EPA
comments, reflected a strong assertion of liberty values—that is,
the freedom to set and then implement the company’s own goals.
The statement made clear that the company considered a
federally-legislated “national energy policy” and its own
voluntary responses to be superior to the unilateral regulatory
imposition of the EPA. Of course, Duke Energy did not explain
what federal legislation it would prefer or whether it had been
106 Id.
107 Id. 26–27.
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engaged in any lobbying for such legislation, but its statement
implied that any “comprehensive federal legislation” should
involve its and the power industry’s buy-in. The statement thus
heavily leaned on the libertarian value of uncoerced, free
markets—a moral vector embraced by many progressives.
Perhaps most interesting was the way that the company
treated its Sustainability Report as a securities disclosure.
Recognizing that CSR reports have become material also to
public investors, the company’s Sustainability Report concluded
its discussion of the clean power plan with a caveat that the
company’s GHG emissions could increase as the economy
improved. (In fact, the last page of the report provided a
boilerplate disclaimer on forward-looking statements, thus to
gain safe-harbor treatment under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
predictions that might turn out to be wrong. The page also added
a note on reconciling financials non-GAAP financials to GAAP.
Duke Energy will continue to be actively engaged in the development
of the EPA’s CO2 regulations with the focus on outcomes that are in
the best interest of customers and shareholders. The company will
also continue to modernize its generation fleet and implement
technologies to improve efficiency, which will help continue to lower
CO2 emissions.108
That is, the company declared that its role in a free market to
supply what customers want at market prices—strong
libertarian values—trump any progressive values to avoid harm
to the environment.
It is interesting to compare the company’s Sustainability
Report to its EPA comments. While the company strongly and
extensively questioned the legality of the EPA’s proposal in its
EPA comments, seemingly to set the stage to join a judicial
challenge of the EPA plan, its stated position in the Sustainability
Report on the clean power plan was to “actively engage” in
shaping the regulations, thus suggesting that it was willing to
work to balance harm to environment with loyalty to customers.
Noticeably absent in its Sustainability Report was anymention of
the federalism concerns or the tradition of state-based utility
regulation—that is, the values of order and authority that framed
its EPA comments. The company seemed to take more of a
libertarian/progressive approach toward the EPA proposal—at
least in its statements addressed to its stakeholders, who the
company described as including employees, contractors,
customers, state economies, and communities (including,
108 Id. at 27.
2018] CORPORATE TRIPLESPEAK 1019
explicitly, those affected by Duke’s coal-ash spill on the Dan River
in North Carolina).
V. EXPLANATIONS OF TRIPLESPEAK
The responses by large investor-owned utilities to the
EPA’s proposed clean power plan reflected a triplespeak at two
levels. Across the industry, the companies exhibited different
moral matrices, weighting the different moral vectors differently
in their public statements about the proposed Clean Power Plan.
Some companies were more conservative, somemore libertarian,
and some more progressive than their counterparts. In many
respects, this is quite unremarkable. Different companies even
within the same industry take different views on different
issues—reflecting differences in company culture, business
focus, leadership proclivities, even regional allegiances.
The more interesting phenomenon revealed in the
company responses to the EPA plan was how within each
sampled company there was a divergence (sometimes even a
cacophony) of viewpoints. But, again, this can be seen as quite
unremarkable. As organizational theory teaches, within a
company’s organizational chart lie many functions, each with a
different audience having its own peculiar agendas and
expectations.109 Thus, individuals operating in the modern
corporation find themselves operating in different political,
social, and economic contexts. In investor-owned utility
companies, the government affairs departments responsible for
submitting comments to the EPA live in the more traditional
world of political connections and state-based utility regulation;
the financial departments responsible for preparing 10-K filings
live in a libertarian world of market freedom and constantly-
shifting risks to business profitability; and the corporate
sustainability departments responsible for creating CSR reports
live in a progressive world of people, planet, and (some) profits.110
109 See CHRISTIE & MARTIN, supra note 58, at 1097 Organizational theory has
long recognized that the political, social, and economic “surroundings” in which
individuals operate create a “context” that limits and shapes the individual’s
“institutional and imaginative assumptions.” Id.
110 In some ways, this “deconstruction” of the stated views by the sampled IOUs
is similar to the “critical legal studies” enterprise of identifying legal statements as
value-laden exercises in power. See Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1236 (1981) (stating that the “critical method” seeks to
reduce “abstract universals to concrete social settings” and thus expose “how patterns of
domination, exploitation, and oppression within those settings relate to the abstract
universals”, with the “task of [the critical] scholar . . . to expose as ideology what appears
to be [ ] fact or ethical norm.”).
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But I suspect something more was happening. The utility
industry—whether its participants admitted it or not—were living
at the time of the EPA proposal (and continue to live) in a world of
unprecedented change. As rising CO2 levels cause us to re-think
our collective future, the power industry in this country and
throughout the world is under great pressure to adapt and to begin
an irreversible process of de-carbonization. As a new generation of
lower cost power sources and technologies emerge, many of which
are likely to lead to a more distributed and certainly smarter grid,
the traditional utility model is already under strain, a strain that
is likely to become only more intense. And, as the political climate
begins to awake to the radical changes underway in our physical
climate, electric utility companies (especially the bigger ones) will
be compelled to respond to shifting attitudes about their purpose
and responsibilities.
Perhaps the triplespeak within these utility companies
was an organic response to the changing business, political,
consumer environment in which the companies find themselves.
Unsure of which direction their industry will be pushed or
pulled, the companies responded as do organisms in nature—by
releasing a multitude of mutations to respond to whatever the
environment becomes.111 For example, in my own backyard the
oak trees produced last fall more acorns than I can ever
remember—in fact, so many acorns fell to the ground that there
were places you couldn’t see the grass under the piled-high trees-
in-waiting.112 My biologist friends say this is happening
everywhere. Plants are putting out record amounts of seeds,
apparently hoping that some will contain the mutations that will
permit survival of their species.
Thus, triplespeak can be seen as a set of mutations—that
is, a set of different business directions, plans, attitudes,
purposes—from which the company can craft a response or
series of responses to the changing landscape. Just as we as
individuals offer different views or statements in response to a
new situation—a sort of “testing the field”—companies may
speak in different ways to see which approach feels right. If the
corporation is indeed a super-organism—much like a hive of bees
111 See Emma Marris, Trees in Eastern US Head West As Climate Changes,
NATURE (May 17, 2017), http://www.nature.com/news/trees-in-eastern-us-head-west-as-
climate-changes-1.22001#/ref-link-1 [https://perma.cc/NRV2-DHFR].
112 Years in which there is an over-production of acorns are known as “mast
years.” See Katrina Rossos, Acorns and Mast Years: Masses of Acorns and Why, NATURE
WORLD NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/17888/20151
030/acorns-mast-years-masses-why.htm [https://perma.cc/7N7E-PKH8] (identifying one
theory for massive release of acorns to “maximize pollination efficiency”).
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or mound of ants, in which individuals perform specialized
functions for a greater common good—then it would stand to
reason that such super-organisms must have mechanics for
responding to change. Just as individual organisms do this by a
process of mutation, with each mutation’s efficacy tested by
natural selection, it stands to reason that a super-organism
would borrow this survival technique. Though, unlike the quite
slow process for mutation and adaptation in a species, the
mutation and adaptation process for the super-organism
corporation may be much faster.113 In fact, the past two hundred
years of the modern corporation are a testament to the rapidity
of the organism’s capacity for adaptation. But that broader and
deeper inquiry is for another day.
A. Variation Across Utility Companies
One explanation for the different moral matrices
exhibited by the largest investor-owned utilities might be that
each was responding to the political environment specific to the
company. That is, the EPA’s political economy might well be a
reflection of the nation’s political map—or, more specifically, of
the political views of the various state public utility
commissions.114 For example, that a utility company in
California would have different views on the EPA’s proposal
compared to one in Georgia is understandable. It would seem
113 For example, corporations have recently created new internal
mechanisms—such as the monitoring board, compliance and risk management systems,
and shareholder engagement—as adaptations that respond to “growing corporate
complexity, threats to corporate value, and political compromise”—a new “corporate
immune system.” SeeOmari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance
from the Inside Out, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2013).
114 Attitudes among state public utility commissions varied. While some state
regulators (from more conservative states) opposed the EPA’s plan as a federal over-
reach and a threat to state autonomy over energy diversity, most regulators (even in
states where their governors had joined lawsuits challenging the plan) were supportive.
See Klump, supra note 16; Rod Kuckro, Ohio Regulators Tell Lawmakers to Butt Out on
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/
energywire/2015/03/27/stories/1060015862 [https://perma.cc/35YE-K3C8]; Kristi E.
Swartz, Ga. Utility Regulators’ Race Gets Crowded, More Than a Year Before Elections,
ENERGYWIRE, (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net./energywire/stories/1060016577
[https://perma.cc/QX7X-9LN8]. Instead, the state regulators seemed to accept the new
role thrust on them by the EPA’s plan, their responses mostly seeking guidance on how
to comply. Patrick Ambrosio, Clean Power Plan Deadlines May Discourage Emission-
Trading Programs, Some States Say, BLOOMBERG ENVIRON. (Apr. 16 2015),
https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/clean-power-plan-deadlines-may-
discourage-adoption-of-trading-programs-states-say [https://perma.cc/HW9U-HG37];
Andrew Childers, EPA to Propose Federal Plan in August To Guide State Clean Power
Compliance, BLOOMBERGENVIRON. (Apr. 10 2015), https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-
and-energy/epa-to-propose-federal-plan-in-august-to-guide-state-clean-power-plan-
compliance [https://perma.cc/8LX5-78F9].
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likely the California utility would find itself under pressure from
its public utility commission, its local politicians, its consumers,
and even its investors to have a progressive business agenda;
similarly, the Georgia utility would be under pressure from the
same sorts of constituents to be conservative in its views on the
CPP and its choice of fuel mix.
In fact, looking at the ten largest investor-owned utilities,
there seems to be a strong correlation between their moral
matrices and the prevailing politics of the states in which they
operate. Thus, the support of the EPA’s proposal by ConEd, the
largest investor-owned utility in New York and reliant on coal-
fired power generation, may be explained on political grounds,
not necessarily economic ones. Similarly, the opposition to the
EPA’s plan by Westar, the largest investor-owned utility in
Kansas where wind power has taken off, would seem to be
matter of political expedience, not economic calculation.
But the correlation is not perfect, nor does it explain the
triplespeak within the different utilities. Many of the largest
utilities—particularly in the Midwest—took positions in their
comments to the EPA at odds with the comments of their local
politicians. For example, the Berkshire Hathaway utilities that
operate throughout the Central States were decidedly in favor of
the EPA’s proposal, even as politicians in the area lined up
against the EPA plan. And, even more telling, was the failure of
utilities in conservative regions to launch a full-throated attack
on the EPA’s proposal, as reflected in their somewhat balanced
comments to the EPA and their non-committal (even supportive)
statements in their SEC filings and CSR reports.
B. Variation Within Company’s Organizational Chart
The moral attitudes toward the EPA plan varied within
each of the largest investor-owned utilities depending on the
forum in which the company stated its views. Although some
companies were more integrated in their stated views—that is,
generally either more conservative or more progressive than
their counterparts—there was significant variation within
each company.
The story at Duke Energy was one repeated in each of the
sampled investor-owned utilities. The comments to the EPA
generally reflected a conservative agenda, often pointing out
that the proposal upset the traditional (and cozy) regulation of
utilities by state regulators and the EPA’s limited authority to
impose “smokestack” rules for pollutants from individual
generating units. At the same time, the companies’ 10-K
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disclosures describing the expected effect of the proposal on
business and profitability reflected a libertarian bent, with
nearly every company stating its concerns about the risks of the
proposal to the company’s business model and its freedom to
make choices on such matters as fuel mix and energy sources.
Meanwhile, the various statements in the companies’ CSR
reports to the public about their sustainability efforts took a
decidedly more progressive viewpoint, generally pointing to the
efforts of the company (sometimes in coordination with
government programs) to protect vulnerable consumers and an
at-risk environment.
In many respects, none of this is remarkable. It should be
expected that the modern large corporation—even on an
existential question like who and how humanity’s carbon
footprint should be managed—would internally have different
perspectives and thus answers to the same question. Those in
the corporation charged with overseeing regulatory affairs (and
thus comments to the regulator, here the EPA) would
understandably take a traditional view of the question. The story
by Duke Energy and the other sampled utilities revolved around
the company’s role of providing low-cost, reliable energy to a
variety of consumers, under the watchful eye of state utility
regulators and coordinated by the Federal Environmental
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Those in the company charged with financial disclosure
and investor relations took, not surprisingly, a libertarian view
of the corporation as a private business meant to maximize
returns to shareholders, within the constraints of the utility’s
regulatory model. Over the past couple of decades, investor-
owned utility companies—with the opening of interstate supply
markets—have becomemuch bolder as free market participants.
Not surprisingly, the SEC filings are redolent of the language of
corporate profitability and business flexibility.
Those in the company charged with communication and
public affairs (and thus the voluntary CSR reports that have
become a ubiquitous part of the corporate landscape) assumed a
more progressive attitude toward the role of the corporation in
society. Rather than acting as instruments for producing electric
power in an industry whose contours have been defined over the
past century or for engaging in unfettered business activities for
the benefit of investors, the investor-owned utilities described in
the CSR reports have an important social role. They provide
universal electric service to all consumers, while ensuring that
the company’s impact on the air and water is minimized, and
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providing benefits to communities in which the company
operates. The theme of the CSR reports is the responsibility the
utilities have to vulnerable persons and the fragile environment.
But viewing the variation in the moral perspectives
within these utility companies as simply a product of their
organizational charts does not answer why there would be such
a clear, often distinct message from each department. That there
was some coordination seems likely, given that each of the
statements on the EPA proposal whatever their originating
source went through a review by the company’s legal
department. Why would it be seemly—if not acceptable—for the
same company to emphasize the importance of operating within
the existing regulatory model, while stating a preparedness to
respond to changing market circumstances, while also stating a
commitment to its consumers and the environment? Somehow,
it seems, triplespeak was serving an unstated, grander purpose.
C. Variation as Adaptive Mutation
Thus, the observed triplespeak leads to the questions of
why the company engaged in these rhetorical inconsistencies
and what purposes the inconsistency might serve. When
confronted by individuals unable to make up their minds, we
describe them as suffering from cognitive dissonance. But
cognitive dissonance in a multi-purpose organization—which
seeks to serve investors, consumers, managers, workers, local
economies, and society at large—will perhaps invariably lack
rhetorical and philosophical cohesion. While as individuals, we
feel compelled to create a sense of moral integrity and often seek
to embrace a coherent set of social and political views,
reinforcing them by exposing ourselves to others (especially
information sources) that succor our views, the corporation may
not be so driven.
So what is the corporate purpose? As the debate over this
question still rages, the answer seems clear, right before our noses:
the purpose of the modern for-profit corporation is multi-faceted.115
Thus, it is neither inconsistent nor fraudulent for such corporations
115 See generally Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout,Contested Visions: The Value
of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2018). Belinfanti and Stout
point out that the “nature and purpose of the corporations remain hotly contested.” Id.
at 579. They further assert that the emerging view that the corporation should be seen
as serving “long-term shareholder value” fails to provide a framework for management
accountability, given that nearly all corporate decisions and actions can be framed as
serving such value. Id. at 596–98. Instead, they assert that “systems theory” (using
design and performance measures for multi-goal systems) offers an answer—
particularly in assessing corporate sustainability. See generally id.
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to say multiple things to multiple audiences. If each audience
understands that the corporation necessarily has a split (and
shifting) personality—where there is no expectation or even
striving for cognitive integrity—then nobody is really misled.116
Investors likely know that the posturing before the
regulator probably does not reflect the company’s true assessment
of the validity (and likely effects) of a regulatory initiative, and the
feel-good statements in the CSR reports are likely not seen by
investors or others as material representations on revenue quality,
employee productivity, or even the real orientation of the business.
And even financial disclosures to investors about risks are
discounted as boilerplate—that is, investors understand them as
incantations meant to forestall second-guessing suits claiming
securities fraud.
Likewise, regulators know that the comments on a
regulatory proposal are often posturing for political purposes—
for example, to gain credibility with the anti-regulation political
crowd. The EPA is unlikely to come down hard only on those
companies that took a stance against a regulatory proposal that
becomes law. Likewise, it seems unlikely that regulators read
CSR reports as an indication of a company’s compliance
agenda—that is, such reports have only tangential meaning to
the company’s status as a regulated entity. Even the public
understands (or should understand) that CSR reports are feel-
good statements of aspiration, not binding promises or even
verifiable truth about the company’s willingness to accomplish
its stated goals.
That is, the corporate voice is far from an integrated
mouthpiece, but may rather be simply a set of kabuki dancers
each performing a different dance—but for a broader, organic
purpose. Without the ability to try out a shareholder primacy
model in SEC filings, or check the fit of a “don’t tread on me”
approach with regulators, or a set of universalist exclamations
in CSR reports, the corporation is left without a dialectic. It is
triplespeak that may well allow the corporation, internally and
externally, to adapt to its changing political, economic,
technological, and physical environments. Among other things,
116 Things are different when the corporation says one thing and does another,
contrary to the expectations of those who have an interest in the words resulting in
action. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, “We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer”:
Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541 (2004) (criticizing corporate speech
that suggests company’s interest in “racial diversity” when this “diversity rhetoric” does
not lead to actual anti-discrimination efforts). Empty rhetoric without action—where
action is implied and expected—increases the likelihood of conflict and litigation. Id.
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triplespeak permits the corporation to “test the waters” of its
moral direction.117
If it turns out—as seems to have been the case for the last
century—that the shareholder-wealth-maximizing corporation is
the optimal design for business in an extractive society, then
keeping a storehouse of libertarian values (and language) will
facilitate pushing corporations in this direction. If the regulated
corporation—which may define the investor-owned utility more
than any other industry—is optimal for a particular business
function, then having at hand the conservative values of ordered
authority and loyalty to a served community will permit the
corporation to articulate and define itself according to this
function. If the CSR corporation—a direction in which many
businesses seem to be headed and one on which many have
already embarked with solid recent success—is actually where we
are headed, then having at hand an articulation of the progressive
values of care and fairness, mixed with a new sacred regard for
Gaia, helps prepare for the universalist business.
CONCLUSION
Triplespeak in investor-owned utilities—perhaps a
microcosm of a corporate triplespeak that may well be engulfing
the planet—suggests that the corporate organism is preparing
itself for radical change.
A half century ago, Stephen Stills captured what may
be happening:
There’s something happening here
But what it is ain’t exactly clear
There’s a man with a gun over there
Telling me I got to beware
. . . .
There’s battle lines being drawn
Nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong
117 Psychological studies show that individuals often re-frame their own moral
codes to best serve themselves. James Dungan & Liane Young, Multiple Moralities:
Tensions and Tradeoffs in Moral Psychology and the Law, 36 T. MARSHAL L. REV. 177,
191 (2011) (commenting that “[o]ften we become our own law-makers, re-writing our own
morals to better serve ourselves”); see also C. Daniel Batson, et al., Moral Hypocrisy:
Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525,
525–37 (1999).
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Young people speaking their minds
Are getting so much resistance from behind
It’s time we stop
Hey, what’s that sound
Everybody look—what’s going down118
118 BUFFALO SPRINGFIELD, FORWHAT IT’SWORTH (Atco Records 1967). See For
What It’s Worth Lyrics, METRO LYRICS, http://www.metrolyrics.com/for-what-its-worth-
lyrics-buffalo-springfield.html [https://perma.cc/LCR6-2CVD].
